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JCOMMENTS

I

THE IMPACT OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS ON THE
PENNSYLVANIA BORROWING STATUTE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse
Auto. Airbrake Co.' The court decided that the statute of limitations in a suit for indemnification is determined by looking to
the jurisdiction where the satisfaction of judgment was entered.
This was in Florida where the applicable statute of limitations is
three years, and since the plaintiff had not commenced the action
until more than three years had elapsed, the suit was barred.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the interrelationship among statutes of limitations, tolling statutes, and borrowing
statutes to determine their strengths and deficiencies in dealing
with conflict of laws problems; to explore the specialized problems which will arise in this area due to Pennsylvania's acceptance of the significant contacts doctrine of conflict of laws; and
to advance solutions to those problems.
In the principal case the plaintiff, Mack, had installed in its
trucks brake assemblies purchased from the defendant, BendixWestinghouse. One truck was sold to a Florida resident who
was subsequently involved in an accident caused by a defective
brake part. A party injured in the accident brought an action in
Florida against Mack and recovered a $13,028.95 judgment. According to Florida law, Mack could not join Bendix-Westinghouse
in the action, but the latter was notified as to the suit.
On June 30, 1960, a formal satisfaction of judgment was entered
in the records of the Florida court. On October 10, 1963, more
than three years later, Mack brought suit for indemnity against
Bendix-Westinghouse in the Federal District Court for Western
Pennsylvania. Defendants asserted that the action was controlled
by the Pennsylvania borrowing statute,2 which states:
When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of
the state or county in which it arose, such bar shall be a
complete defense to an action thereon brought in any of the
courts of this commonwealth.
The defense was sustained by the district court and Mack appealed
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. A majority of the appellate
1.
2.

372 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 39 (1953).
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court reasoned that Pennsylvania's borrowing statute was binding
on the court; that the cause of action arose in Florida where
the formal satisfaction of judgment was entered;3 and that since
the applicable statute of limitations according to Florida law was
three years, 4 the action was barred in Pennsylvania.
The dissent argued that Pennsylvania is committed to the con-5
flict of laws rule announced in Griffith v. United Air Lines,
commonly called "center of gravity" or "significant contacts" [hereinafter referred to as significant contacts]. The rule is that when
an action involves more than one state, the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the case and interest
in its outcome will be applied. Assuming as did the dissent in
Mack that Pennsylvania had the most significant contacts,6 Pennsylvania's law should be applied.7
A thorough understanding of borrowing statutes requires a
familiarity with statutes of limitations.8 A statute of limitations
is a statute of repose. 9 It is "[a] statute prescribing limitations to
the right of action on certain described causes of action; that is,
declaring that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action
unless brought within a specified period after the right accrued."' 1
Policy reasons are offered to support statutes of limitations. "There
comes a time when he [the defendant] ought to be secure in his
reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of
ancient obligations, and he ought not be called on to resist a claim
when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.""

".

.

. [T]he public interest is best served by

3. Pennsylvania's borrowing statute speaks in terms of when a cause
of action arises rather than where it arises. The majority decided that
when a cause of action arises and where it arises are in pari materia; therefore, since the cause of action arose when the satisfaction of judgment was
entered, it arose in Florida where the satisfaction of judgment was entered.
4. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11 5(e) (1960).
5. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
6. The majority did not rule beyond the statute of limitations question; therefore, the determination of which state had the most significant
contacts was left unanswered. There is good reason to believe, as the
dissent suggests, that Pennsylvania would be the state with the most significant contacts since all of the following events occurred in Pennsylvania:
(1) manufacture of the defective brake part; (2) delivery and installation
of the part; (3) contracting between the parties for the manufacture of
the part; and (4) institution of the court action. Thus Pennsylvania, not
Florida, had the major interest in determining liability for indemnity.
7. The applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations in this case
would be either four years under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (1954) or six years for contract actions generally,
PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
8. This paper deals entirely with civil statutes of limitations rather
than limitations in criminal cases.
9. E.g., Phila. B. & W. R.R. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 282 Pa.
362, 127 A. 845 (1925).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (4th ed. 1951).
11. DeveLopment in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L.
REv.1177, 1185 (1950).
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the certainty gained by the prohibition of untimely
and stale
'12
claims, and the incidental evils connected therewith.
In the conflict of laws setting the public policy favoring statutes of limitations has raised a number of problems. In particular,
courts have faced the question whether the statute of limitations
of a foreign jurisdiction should be given effect on the forum,
thereby further lengthening or limiting the forum's statute of limitations. Prior to the enactment of borrowing statutes, the forum
looked first to the foreign statute of limitations to decide whether
it was substantive or procedural.13 If substantive, it was given
effect to limit the cause of action being litigated; 14 if procedural,
it was simply disregarded and the forum's statute of limitations
was exclusively applied. 15
Today, most states have enacted borrowing statutes to control
cases which arise in foreign jurisdictions.16 The effect of these
statutes is to engraft into the law of the forum the time limitation prescribed
by the foreign jurisdiction. The result is to further
17
limit

the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit in the forum on

a cause of action which arose outside the state.' 8

Some courts

12. State v. Robertson, 417 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. App. 1967); accord,
Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Texas 1967).

Encouragement of future commercial activity and freedom of

movement seems to call for a reasonably certain cut-off point.
Indefinite delays in the barring of actions place an added burden
on an already strained court system by permitting the trial of stale
claims in which evidence and witnesses are uncertain or unavailable.
Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes,
32 ROCKY Mr. L. REV. 287, 297 (1960) (discussing statutes of limitations,
borrowing statutes, and tolling legislation).

13.

For a discussion of the various tests used in determining whether

a particular statute of limitations is substantive or procedural, see Bournias
v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. E.g., Penna Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
15. E.g., Corrigan v. Clairol, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1954);
Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959).
16. Eleven states have not enacted borrowing statutes of general effect: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and
Vermont. In these states, causes of action which have arisen in foreign
jurisdictions are still handled in the procedural-substantive manner. E.g.,
Smith v. Turner, 91 N.H. 198, 17 A.2d 87 (1940).
17. Until recently, Kentucky stood alone among the states in holding
that the "borrowed" statute of limitations would lengthen as well as limit

the forum's statute of limitations.

Albanese v. Ohio River-Frankfort

Cooperage Corp., 125 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Gibson v. Womack, 218
Ky. 626, 291 S.W. 1021 (1927). In Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965), however, Kentucky withdrew from that posi-

tion and now is in line with the other jurisdictions holding that a borrowing statute may only shorten the forum's limitation, not lengthen it. The
Seat decision was followed in Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762
(6th Cir. 1967) and Wethington v. Griggs, 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
18. Mangene v. Diamond, 229 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1956); Wilt v. Smack,
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apparently have misconstrued borrowing statutes to mean that
the forum "borrows" only the foreign statute of limitations. 9 The
majority view is that the forum looks not only to the foreign state's
statute of limitations, but also to its other pertinent laws.2 0 The
most important laws "borrowed" along with the statute of limita147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Moore v. Roschen, 93 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950); Stoody v. Wandel, 6 Chester 219 (C.P. Pa. 1954).
19. See Brown v. Westport Finance Co., 145 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo.
1956) (by implication). The court said:
This statute [Missouri's borrowing statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.190
(Supp. 1967)] makes statutes of limitations of the foreign state in
which the cause of action accrued a statute of limitations of Missouri, and in effect, a special statute of limitations applicable to
causes of action arising in foreign states.
145 F. Supp. at 267. Smith v. Bain, 123 F. Supp. 632 (M.D. Pa. 1954) (by
implication). This case involved an automobile accident which occurred
in Virginia between plaintiff, a Florida resident, and defendant, a New York
resident temporarily stationed at a Pennsylvania Army base. The court
looked only to the one year Virginia statute of limitations and decided that
since the action was commenced more than one year after the accident,
it was barred. Since Virginia has only a limited tolling statute [VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-33 (1957)] and a nonresident motorist statute [VA. CODE ANN. §
8-67.1 (1957)] the court probably reached a correct decision, but the court
did not allude to those statutes at all, thereby indicating that the decision
was based simply on the "borrowed" statute of limitations. Lepper v.
Brenner, 92 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (by implication). This case
involved the same general facts as Smith v. Bain, supra. The court simply
said, ".

.

. the present action has been 'fully barred' by the applicable

[Delaware] statute of limitations." 92 F. Supp. at 166. Fletcher's Estate,
45 Pa. D. & C. 673 (Orphans' Ct. Bedford 1942) (by implication). The
defendant had delivered a promissory note to plaintiff, apparently a
Maryland resident. The court said the cause of action arose in Maryland
and was barred by Maryland's three year statute of limitations. There
was no discussion of Maryland's tolling legislation [MD. AnN. CODE art. 57,
§ 5 (1964)] which probably tolled the running of the statute of limitations.
Ohio appears to be an exception to the general rule. That state's
avowed intention is to "borrow" only the statute of limitations of the
foreign state and completely disregard the foreign state's tolling legislation.
Lynn v. Wade, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Payne v. Kirchwehm,
141 Ohio 384, 48 N.E.2d 224 (1943); Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio
30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941). Professor Ester contends that Ohio's interpretation is simply one of two acceptable applications of borrowing statutes,
in fact, possibly the better view. Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation
and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 57-58 (1962).
20. Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (Delaware's
statute of limitations tolled due to that state's Journey's Account Statute
[DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8117 (1953)]); State Compensation Ins. Fund v.
Proctor & Schwartz, 102 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (California's statute
of limitations was tolled by the fact that defendant could not be served
with process within that state); Fulkerson v. Amer. Chain & Cable Co., 72
F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (Kentucky's saving statute [Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 413.270 (1963)] gave plaintiff an additional three months to begin
action); Rex Transp. Co. v. Freeman, 26 Lehigh 372, 69 York 106 (C.P.
Pa. 1955) (Michigan's statute of limitations tolled due to defendant's nonresidence in that state). Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and ConContra, Ohio cases, see note
flict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 57 (1962).
19 supra.
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tions are tolling statutes which stop the running of the statute of
limitations.21 Also applicable as "accouterments" to be examined
along with the foreign state's statute of limitations are nonresident
motorist statutes 22 and long-arm statutes. 23 In one case, George v.
Douglas Aircraft Co.,24 a federal court implied that a foreign

state's borrowing statute might also be borrowed by the forum
thereby making a third state's statute of limitations applicable.2 5
The widely accepted rule is that the "borrowed" statute of limitions does not displace that of the forum; it applies only when the
foreign statute of limitations bars the action.26 In other words, the
forum's statute of limitations is still always applicable and will
bar an action in the forum although it arose in a foreign jurisdiction.27 It is thus incorrect to say that the forum borrows the
foreign state's statute of limitations; rather, the forum's borrowing
21. The most common type of tolling legislation is that which stops
the running of the statute of limitations due to defendant's absence from
the state. For an example of this type of tolling statute see note 30 infra.
For an excellent discussion of the diverse tolling provisions in various
states and a proposed uniform statute of limitations based on Pennsylvania's
tolling statute [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 40 (1953) ] see Vernon, The Uniform
Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND.
L. REV. 971 (1959).

Another type of tolling provision is the saving statute or Journey's
Account Statute which generally provides that the statute of limitations is
tolled or an extension is given when an action is dismissed due to lack of
venue. For an example of this type of statute, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8117 (1953). See also Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
Fulkerson v. Amer. Chain & Cable Co., 72 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
22. E.g., Mangene v. Diamond, 299 F. Supp. 554 (3d Cir. 1956); Hornsey v. Jacono, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 219 (C.P. Del. 1957).
23. E.g., Mangene v. Diamond, 229 F. Supp. 554 (3d Cir. 1956); Hornsey v. Jacono, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 219 (C.P. Del. 1957).
24. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. Id. at 78. This type of "renvoi" should be avoided as causing too
much confusion in conflict of laws cases.
26. Otis v. Bennett, 91 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1937); Continental Ill. Nat'l.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Holmes, 21 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Pa. 1937); Rosenzweig
v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346 (1931); Shaffer's Estate, 228 Pa. 36, 76 A.
716 (1910); Oldhouser v. Stauffer, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 647 (C.P. York 1959);
Kavanough v. Lee, 48 Pa. D. & C. 276 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1943). Contra, Maki
v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1942); Wilson v. Massengill,
124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1942). In both Maki and Wilson the court decided
that since a specific statute of limitations had been made applicable to the
respective actions, that statute of limitations was "substantive" and would

lengthen the forum's statute of limitations. In other words, the "substan-

tive" foreign statute of limitations displaced the forum's limitation and
became the only applicable time period. This view is generally not followed in the state courts. See note 17 supra.
27. Otis v. Bennett, 91 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1937); Continental Ill. Nat'l.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Holmes, 21 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Pa. 1937); Rosenzweig
v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346 (1931); Shaffer's Estate, 228 Pa. 36, 76 A.
716 (1910); Oldhouser v. Stauffer, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 647 (C.P. York 1959);
Kavanough v. Lee, 48 Pa. D. & C. 276 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1943). Contra, Maki
v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1942); Wilson v. Massengill,
124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1942).
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statute allows the defendant to plead the defense he gained under
the foreign state's statute of limitations. This distinction is important. To say that the foreign statute of limitations is made a
"special" statute of the forum could lead to disregarding other of
28
the foreign state's pertinent law, namely tolling legislation.
Tolling statutes are laws which prevent the running of the
29
forum's statute of limitations until the defendant returns to,
0
8
comes into, or becomes a resident ' of the forum. In the absence
of borrowing statutes they create the possibility of perpetual liability. 2 Until the defendant becomes subject to the forum's service of process, its statute of limitations does not run; a defendant
who first enters the forum forty years after the cause of action
arose would have no statute of limitations defense to a suit. Since
one of the aims of a statute of limitations is to prevent litigation of
stale claims,' 3 this situation must be alleviated. Borrowing statutes solve the problem of perpetual liability in many instances.
For example, if the defendant has a defense under the statute
of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose, he need
not worry that the forum's statute of limitations has not run. By
using the forum's borrowing statute, he can successfully plead the
defense. It was apparently thought by some that borrowing stat84
utes would solve the problem of perpetual liability in all cases.
If the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action
28. See discussions and cases cited p. 600-01 & note 19 supra.
29. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 351 (West 1954) (emphasis added):
If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of
the State, the action may be commenced within the term herein
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of
action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence
is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
30. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-30 (1953):
If, when a cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of
the State or has absconded or concealed himself, the period limited for the commencement of the action by any statute of limitations shall not begin to run until he comes into the state or while
he is so absconded or concealed. If after the cause of action
accrues, he departs from the state or abscond or conceal himself,
the time of his absence or concealment shall not be computed as
a part of the period within which the action must be brought.
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-606 (1967): "(a) The time during which the
defendant is a nonresident of the state shall not be computed in any of the
"

periods of limitation ....

32. See George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964);
Cvicich v. Giardino, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 99 P.2d 573 (1940); Rex Transp.
Co. v. Freeman, 26 Lehigh 372, 69 York 106 (C.P. Pa. 1955); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. Rav. 33
(1962); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws; Borrowing
Statutes, 32 RocKY Mr. L. REV. 287 (1960).
33. See discussion of purposes of statutes of limitations p. 599-600 &
notes 9-12 supra.
34. Cvicich v. Giardinio, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 99 P.2d 573 (1940). In
Cvicich the court said, ".

.

. § 361 of the Code of Civil Procedure .

.

. pro-

vides an ample safeguard against the enforcement of stale foreign claims
in this state." 99 P.2d at 576. Section 361 referred to above is California's
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arose is tolled because the defendant left that state, and the forum's statute of limitations is tolled until defendant becomes subject to service of process there, perpetual liability still exists. 5
Pennsylvania does not have the problem of perpetual liability
due to its limited tolling legislation. 3 Pennsylvania's tolling statute states:
In all civil suits and actions in which the cause of action
shall have arisen within this state the defendant or defendants in such suit or action, who shall have become
non-resident of the state after said cause of action shall
have arisen, shall not have the benefit of any statute of
this state for the limitations of action during the period
of such residence without the state. 7
Pennsylvania's tolling statute deals only with causes of action which have arisen within the state. As a second requirement,
it tolls the statute of limitations only as to residents who have gone
out of the state after the cause of action arose. The Pennsylvania
statute of limitations does not toll causes of action which arise
outside the state. This limitation then precludes perpetual liability in a true conflict of laws case litigated in Pennsylvania
courts.38
Pennsylvania's statute of limitations begins to run
borrowing statute [CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 361 (West 1954)] which states:
When a cause of action has arisen in another State, or a foreign
country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there
be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this State,

except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and

who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
The Cvicich court did not take into account the effect of California's tolling
legislation [CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 351 (West 1954)] [see note 29 supra]
which tolls California's statute of limitations until the defendant "returns"
to that state. Here, since the defendant was not a resident of New York,
where the cause of action arose, that state's statute of limitations was tolled;
also defendant had not returned to California, and according to California's
law, the statute of limitations was tolled. In this situation there existed
a condition of perpetual liability against the defendant until he entered
either New York or California and started the running of either of their
statutes of limitations.
35. For an exception to the textual statement, see the discussion of
Vernon's "realist" approach, note 80 infra.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 40 (1953). Professor Vernon points out
that Mississippi's tolling legislation [MIss. CODE ANN. § 740 (1957) ] has the
same effect as that of Pennsylvania and that those states' statutes are
generally preferred as creating the least problems of perpetual liability.
Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling
Problems, 12 VAND. L. REv. 971 (1959).
37. PA. STAT. ANNm. tit. 12, § 40 (1953) (emphasis added).
38. Perpetual liability can exist in Pennsylvania in limited situations.
For example, if a cause of action arises in Pennsylvania and the defendant,
a Pennsylvania resident, leaves the state prior to the running of the statute
of limitations, the action will not be barred until the defendant returns to
Pennsylvania and the statute of limitations begins to run again. This is
not, however, a true conflict of laws situation since only one state's laws
are involved. This Comment deals only with conflict of laws situations;
therefore, the hypothetical just presented is beyond its scope.
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when the cause of action arises; after its running the action is
barred even though the defendant was never amenable to process
in the state. 9
Since perpetual liability was not a problem in Pennsylvania
its reasons for enacting a borrowing statute must be sought elsewhere. No Pennsylvania legislative records or committee reports
are available, but an examination of case law in other jurisdictions and reasons advanced by legal commentators may shed some
light on the purpose
of the Pennsylvania legislature in enacting a
40
borrowing statute.
First. It might have been thought that the enactment of borrowing statutes would create a uniform conflict of laws system in
which the choice of the forum would make no difference in the
outcome of the case. While such a view towards resolving conflicts of laws problems is commendable, the variance in language
and in interpretation of the different borrowing statutes create a
result which is anything but uniform. In addition, it should be
noted that not all states have borrowing statutes. 41 Their absence, in practice, prevents the ideal of uniformity from being
reached. It should not, however, deter states from improving their
conflict of laws system through the enactment of well-drafted borrowing statutes.
Even assuming that all states would enact borrowing statutes,
uniformity would not be achieved due to the existing importance
of statutes of limitations and tolling legislation. For uniformity to
exist, the fifty states would have to enact uniform statutes of limitations, uniform tolling legislation, and uniform borrowing statutes. 42 Some breakthrough has been achieved 43 by the widespread

adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code which contains a saving
39. Otis v. Bennett, 91 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1937); cf. Ditch v. Baylor, 7
Lebanon 33 (C.P. Pa. 1958); Grabowski v. Noltes, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 627
(C.P. Allegheny 1957); Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on
Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1959).
40. The list of reasons presented for the enactment of borrowing statutes is not exclusive, but represents those most commonly accepted. For
a more extensive list of specialized reasons, see Ester, Borrowing Statutes
of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962).
41. See note 16 supra.
42. As to the possibility of uniform statutes of limitations, tolling
statutes, and borrowing statutes see Uniform Statute of Limitations on
Foreign Claims Act,

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-

264 (1957); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of
Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); Vernon,
Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960); Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations
on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1959).
43. It does not follow that because the states have accepted the Uniform Commercial Code they intended to specifically deal with limitation
of action problems. The section of the Uniform Commercial Code containing the statute of limitations and saving statute was only a small part
of an integration of all commercial law.
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
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statute 44 and a four year statute of limitations for the "breach of
any contract for sale. ' 45 Notwithstanding the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the possibility of a movement among the
states to accept a completely uniform system of conflict of laws
dealing with limitation of actions is unlikely. 46 Since 1957 when
the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act was
approved only Michigan 47and West Virginia 48 have accepted it.
This indicates either a lack of interest or a lack of awareness of
the problem.
Second. A legitimate purpose for the enactment of borrowing
statutes is to prevent forum shopping. 49 In a limited sense forum
shopping can be defined as looking for a court which will hear a
cause of action after it has been barred in the jurisdiction where
the cause of action arose.50
In Pennsylvania, forum shopping may have been a reason for
the enactment of the borrowing statute; however, there is probably less reason for the claimant in a cause of action arising outside of Pennsylvania to select Pennsylvania as a forum than there
would be to select most other jurisdictions. This result obtains
because no tolling legislation exists for causes of action arising outside the state. Once the statute of limitations has run in Pennsylvania on a cause of action arising outside the state the defendant has a complete defense to the action in all Pennsylvania courts.
Thus, even if Pennsylvania did not have a borrowing statute, there
would in most situations be only a short period of time when a
foreign plaintiff would consider forum shopping in Pennsylvania;
that is, only from the time when the defense was perfected in the
state where the cause of action arose until the time when Penn44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(3). It is unfortunate that the
authors of the Uniform Commercial Code refused to go further and propose a uniform tolling statute. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(4)
states:
"This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations ...."
The official comment to that section states: "Subsection (4) makes it
clear that this Article does not purport to alter or modify in any respect
the law on tolling of the Statute of Limitations as it now prevails in the
various jurisdictions." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725, Comment.
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(1).
46. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 264 (1957).
47. MICH. STAT. ANN. 27 A. 5861 (1962).
48. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2A-1 to -6 (1966).
49. Moore v. Roschen, 93 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Cvicich v.

Giardino, 37 Cal. App. 2d 394, 99 P.2d 573 (1940); Pack v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); cf. George v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964) (by implication).

50.

The court in Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957) suc-

cinctly delimited the problem of forum shopping when it stated:

".

.

. the

purpose of [Pennsylvania's borrowing statute] is simply to insure that a
plaintiff who sues in Pennsylvania obtains thereby no greater rights than
those given in the state where his cause of action arose. . .

."

Id. at 704.
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sylvania's statute of limitations barred the action. It appears,
therefore, that forum shopping would have been a problem only in a
small number of cases.
Third. Some states purposely slant their borrowing statutes to
give maximum benefit to their residents. New York's borrowing
statute is one example:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without
the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the
time limited by the laws of either the State or the place
without the State where the cause of action accrued, except
that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the State the time limited by the laws of the
State shall apply.51
A New York resident-plaintiff need not worry about the defendant pleading a foreign state's statute of limitations since the
borrowing statute clearly makes the New York statute of limitations the only applicable time period.5 2 Thus, the New York resident-plaintiff is in a better position than a nonresident suing in that
state.
Some courts have implied that a second purpose of New York's
borrowing statute is "to afford New York resident-defendants the
benefit of the shortest applicable period of limitation." 5 The statute, however, makes no distinction between resident-defendants
and nonresident-defendants. To restrict its effect to resident-defendants is unwarranted. If the New York legislature had intended
to benefit only resident-defendants, the borrowing statute could
have been worded restrictively to facilitate that result. Since Pennsylvania's borrowing statute makes no distinction between the resident and nonresident plaintiff or defendant, it would seem that
Pennsylvania's legislature did not enact the statute to benefit solely
residents of the state. All defendants may use the statute.
In summary, borrowing statutes have been enacted for the following reasons: (1) to create a uniform system of conflict of laws
dealing with statutes of limitations; (2) to prevent forum shopping;
(3) to remove the possibility of perpetual liability; and (4) to benefit residents of the enacting state.5 4 As has been discussed, remov51. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1963).
52. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1963) practice commentary by Joseph M. McLaughlin which states: "If the cause of action
arises in New York or if the plaintiff is a New York resident at the time
the cause of action accrues to him, only the New York period of limitations
controls."
53. Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), quoting
from Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shops, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).

54. Another important reason for the enactment of borrowing statutes

is the attempt to produce a symmetrical system of conflict of laws. To
avoid repetition, treatment was omitted here as it will be extensively discussed at p. 609-11 infra.
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ing perpetual liability and benefiting the state's residents are reasons inapplicable to Pennsylvania.
In light of the generally accepted reasons for enacting borrowing statutes, it may be asked why Pennsylvania's borrowing statute was not drafted so as to give it broader application. The wording of the statute restricts the defendant to pleading a defense under the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action
arose. Of course, apart from the borrowing statute the defendant
may plead any limitations defense he may have under the forum's
statute of limitations. If he has a defense under a third state, but
none under the state where the cause of action arose or the forum,
the borrowing statute is no aid and he may not plead his defense. "'
The following hypothetical illustrates this problem: a cause of action arises in state A which has a two year statute of limitations
and tolling legislation which stops the running of A's statute of
limitations when the defendant is not amenable to process. The
defendant immediately removes to state B which has a five year
statute of limitations and he remains there for a full five years.
The defendant then enters Pennsylvania which has an applicable
six year statute of limitations; he is duly served with process. Under the Pennsylvania borrowing statute the court would look to
state A's statute of limitations to determine whether the action is
barred by that statute. Then it would look to Pennsylvania's statute of limitations to see if it provides a defense to the action. Finding that A's statute of limitations is still tolled, and that Pennsylvania's has not entirely run, the action would be permitted.5 6
55. Runkle v. Pullin, 49 Ind. App. 619, 97 N.E. 956 (1912). The defendant apparently had a good defense under Nebraska's statute of limitations, but since that state was neither the state where the cause of action
arose nor the forum, the defendant could not plead his defense. Cf. Les
Schwimley Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.
Cal. 1967). But cf. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1964).
56. Under Professor Vernon's "realist" theory, discussed in note 80
infra, the action would be barred. It would also be barred under Vernon's
proposed borrowing statute which states:
If a claim against a person who has been amendable (sic) to service of process in any jurisdiction within the United States for its
entire statutory period of limitations is barred by the limitation
laws of that jurisdiction, whether such bar is deemed remedial or
substantive, it shall be barred in this state.
Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287, 328 (1960).
The action in the above hypothetical would not, however, be barred
under Professor Ester's proposed borrowing statute which states:
No action shall be maintainable in this state if barred by the limitation laws of the jurisdiction in which defendant resided when
the claim against him first became subject to enforcement by judicial proceedings. Provided, however, that if the laws of such
jurisdiction toll or suspend the running of its period of limitation
due to the absence of defendant from that jurisdiction, action must
be commenced in this state no later than five years after the time
when the limitation period of such jurisdiction would have ex-
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A probable reason for Pennsylvania's failure to enact a broader
borrowing statute to allow a defense in the above situation is
that at the time the borrowing statute was enacted it followed the
"traditional rule" of conflict of laws. That is, if the action sounds
in tort, the forum applies the substantive law of the jurisdiction
where the wrong was committed;5 7 if in contract, it applies the
substantive law of the place of contracting or performance. 58 The
traditional rule and Pennsylvania's borrowing statute were compatible: 59 the traditional rule led the court to the substantive law
of the state where the cause of action arose and the borrowing
statute led, in effect, to the application of that state's statute of
limitations.8 0
Today, however, Pennsylvania no longer follows the traditional
rule; it has modified it by acceptance of the "significant contacts"
doctrine announced in Griffith v. United Air Lines."' Since Pennsylvania's borrowing statute appears to have been enacted in a form
which made it compatible with the traditional rule, the advent of
significant contacts may have an effect on the interpretation and
application of the borrowing statute. The present borrowing statute and significant contacts do not always lead to a symmetrical
system of conflict of laws. For example, in Mack the court would
pired had defendant remained continually amenable to action in

such jurisdiction.
Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA.
L. REV. 33, 77 (1962). Under Ester's borrowing statute the action would
not be barred until seven years after it arose (two years for state A's statute of limitations plus a five year extension).
57. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378-97 (1934).
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
59. Professor Vernon implies that the various borrowing statutes may
have been enacted to partially develop a ". . . symmetrically perfect conflicts system in which the substantive law and the time period are taken
from the same jurisdiction." Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict
of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287, 304 (1960). See
also Les Schwimley Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418,
420-21 (E.D. Cal. 1967) where Judge Halbert commented ".

of the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ...

.

. the essence

militates against the unthink-

able adoption of one forum's statute of limitation in a case which no longer

has any substantive connection with [that] forum."
60. Except in the situation where the forum's statute of limitations
was shorter than that of the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose,
and the action was barred by the statute of limitations of the forum. See
discussion p. 602-03 supra.
61. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). "Significant contacts" has been
followed in Pennsylvania by a number of later cases. Mannke v. Benjamin
Moore & Co., 375 F.2d 281 (1967); Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 259
F. Supp. 573 (1966); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966);
Hunter Adoption Case, 421 Pa. 287, 218 A.2d 764 (1966); Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966); McSwain v. McSwain,
420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). The significant contacts approach has also
been approved in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332, 332b
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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look to one jurisdiction for the substantive law and to another for
the statute of limitations. While this result is "unthinkable" to
some judges, 62 it is nevertheless true in Pennsylvania.6 3 Before
proposing a modified borrowing statute 64 designed simply to
achieve a symmetrical system of conflict of laws, the present borrowing statute will be examined to determine whether any change
in language or interpretation is warranted.
In certain circumstances the present borrowing statute does
not conflict with the significant contacts approach. For example,
assume that the state where the cause of action arose (state A) is
also the state determined to have the most significant contacts.
If the defendant had a good statute of limitations defense in state
A, the action would be barred in the forum. The forum would
look to state A for the substantive law as well as the limited procedural aspect, the statute of limitations. Due to the procedure followed in litigating cases, however, it should be recognized that
the court would never get to the substantive law since the statute
of limitations defense would be an immediate procedural block to
the action. This fact does not detract from the result that the
forum would be looking to the same state for all pertinent laws.
The same result would follow if the action were not barred in
state A, where the cause of action arose, but was barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum. The defendant would have a
good defense since the forum's statute of limitations is applicable
regardless of its borrowing statute. 65
A subsequent variation occurs where the cause of action arises
in state A, but the forum has the most significant contacts and
defendant has a good defense under the forum's statute of limitations. As in the preceding hypothetical, the action would be barred
by the forum's statute of limitations since it is always applicable.
In fact, the logic would be more consistent since the forum's substantive laws would have been applied had the action not been
barred. Thus, there is complete symmetry of applicable substantive
and procedural law.
The most complex analytical problem is raised when the action
is not barred in the forum which is also the state of the most sig62. See quote from Les Schwimley Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp. appearing in note 59 supra.
63. The Mack case is an illustration of the asymmetric result which
may be reached in deciding what state's law is applicable. The court,
however, never got past the statute of limitations question (as discussed
note 6 supra).
64. It would not be difficult to modify Pennsylvania's borrowing statute simply to bring it into line with the significant contact doctrine. The
following example would accomplish that result:
When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the
state or country which has the most significant contacts with the
case, such bar shall be a complete defense to an action thereon
brought in any of the courts of this commonwealth.
65. See discussion p. 602-03 supra.
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nificant contacts, but is barred in the state where the cause of action arose. This situation is illustrated by the Mack6" case. In
Mack the majority had no difficulty deciding that the action should
be barred, but their decision was based on answering ".

.

. the

narrow question of the meaning of the phrase where the cause of
action arose, as used in the Pennsylvania borrowing statute and
applied to a situation in which the cause of action came into existence upon the happening of certain events in Florida. 6 7 If the
cause of action for indemnity did arise in Florida, then based on a
literal reading of Pennsylvania's borrowing statute the majority
decision is unassailable. The dissenting judge did not, however,
approve of so literal an interpretation. He attacked the majority
decision on two grounds: (1) where the cause of action arose; and
(2) the affect of significant contacts in deciding which state's statute of limitations should be applied. 8 As the dissent indicates,
the majority decision is subject to the same criticism as was the
traditional conflict of laws rule. For example, the decision in
Mack is based on the fortuitous69 happening of where the payment
of the Florida judgment, which gave rise to the indemnity action,
occurred. Had the judgment been paid in any of the other fortynine states that particular state would have become the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose with a different result hangThe dissent drew heavily upon the argument of
ing in the balance.
7
fortuitousness.
The traditional rule was also criticized for unduly restricting
judicial discretion. Under it the forum courts were legislatively
bound to look to the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction where
the cause of action arose.71 They could not weigh policy factors in
66. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co.,
372 F.2d 18 (1966).
67. Id. at 21 (dissenting opinion).
68. Id.
69. Cf. Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 229
N.E.2d 107 (1967). For discussion of fortuitousness as an argument against
the traditional rule of conflict of laws, see Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa.
620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Note, Lex Loci Delicti or Significant ContactsThat Is Not the Question, 54 KY. L.J. 728 (1966); Comment, Conflict in the
Conflict of Laws: A Need for Uniformity, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 329 (1966).

70. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co.,

372 F.2d 18, 22 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The dissent also suggests that
the place of payment, which gives rise to the action for indemnity, might
be contrived to give that party the benefit of a particular statute of limitations. It is apparent that the plaintiff in Mack did not "contrive" since
he chose Florida which has a relatively short limitation (three years)
[FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(5) (e) (1960)] as compared to Pennsylvania's six
year limitation [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953)).
71. For criticism of the traditional rule based on the "policy" argument and "rigid application" see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E.2d 99 (1954); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966);
Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
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determining which statute of limitations should apply. 72 This
argument against the traditional rule is applicable to most borrowthe Pennsylvania statute which was aping statutes-particularly
73
plied in Mack.
Notwithstanding the above criticism, there are reasonable
grounds for allowing the defendant to plead his bar under the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose.
The defendant has been amenable to process for the full statutory
time period in a state which has at least some contact with the
case. After perfecting his defense, the defendant should be able to
plead it in actions elsewhere.74 This reason overrides any criticism
based on the fortuitous arising of the cause of action.
It is submitted that the defendant should be able to plead his
good defense under the statute of limitations of the state where the
cause of action arose. This result should obtain even though the
forum is the state with the most significant contacts and under its
statute of limitations the action is not barred. This conclusion is
based on the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff should be prompt
in litigating his action; (2) the plaintiff's burden of watching the
statute of limitations of only two jurisdictions-that of the state
where the cause of action arose and of the forum-is not great;
(3) whatever uniformity exists among the states due to the present
interpretation of borrowing statutes would be decreased by Pennsylvania's failure to recognize the defense; (4) the defendant, once
he has gained a defense under the statute of limitations of the
state where the cause of action arose, should not be precluded
from coming into Pennsylvania until a time when Pennsylvania's
statute of limitations would bar the impending suit because he
fears litigation; and (5) the defendant has been amenable to an
action for a reasonable length of time in the state where the suit
could have been litigated.
According to this reasoning, the court in Mack reached the
proper decision in holding that the defendant should be allowed to
plead his defense under Florida's statute of limitations. The decision was correct based on both a literal interpretation of Pennsylvania's borrowing statute and an investigation of the reasons behind
the enactment.
This conclusion presumes, however, that the court was correct in deciding that the action for indemnity arose in Florida. In
the normal tort case, a cause of action generally arises when and
72. This is not to say that no policy decision has been made, for the
legislature's determination to enact a borrowing statute is itself a policy
determination.
73. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co.,
372 F.2d 18, 22 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
74. Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15
U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of
Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960).
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where the wrong occurs;7 5 in contract cases it arises either at the
place of making 76 or the place of performance 77 of the contract.
If the action is for breach of warranty, it has been held that the
cause of action arises when and where title to the warranted
goods passed.78 In actions for breach of federal law, the cause of
action arises in the jurisdiction which has the most contacts
with the case. 7 9 Some states, however, have said that the cause of
action arises wherever the defendant is amendable to process when
the breach occurs.80
Due to the fact that the action in Mack was based on indemnity,
a type of "quasi-contract," the general rules could not be easily
applied. In determining where the cause of action arose, the court
addresses itself to a number of questions. The first is when did the
cause of action arise. Courts have generally been in agreement that
an action for indemnity arises when the plaintiff has suffered a
loss,"' but they have been divided as to exactly when the plaintiff
75. E.g., Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (automobile
accident); Sicola v. First Nat'l. Bank, 404 Pa. 18, 170 A.2d 584 (1961)
(action for malicious prosecution); Fike v. Mitchell, 23 Fayette 62 (C.P.
Pa. 1960) (automobile accident). Contra, George v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that place of delivery of airplane was
where the cause of action arose notwithstanding that crash occurred elsewhere); Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 229 N.E.2d
107 (1967) (dictum).
76. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 144 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (place
of making loan); Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179,
229 N.E.2d 107 (1967) (place of making or place of performance); Estate of
Ella Luce, 54 York 119 (C.P. Pa. 1940).
77. E.g., Les Schwimley Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F.
Supp. 418 (E.D. Cal. 1967); Backman v. Blaw-Knox Co., 198 F. Supp. 617
(W.D. Pa. 1961) (place of employment is where cause of action arose in
action for breach of employment contract); Wholesale Supply Co. v. South
Chester Tube Co., 20 F.R.D. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Holmes, 21 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Pa. 1937) (place of dishonor is where cause of action arose on a promissory note); Thigpen v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 229 N.E.2d 107 (1967) (place of
making or place of performance); Fletcher's Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 673
(Orphans' Ct. Bedford 1942) (by implication).
78. Stoody v. Wandel, 6 Chester 219 (C.P. Pa. 1954); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725 (2).
79. See, Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (by implication); Lewis
v. Harcliff Coal Co., 237 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (by implication).
80. Timmonds v. Messner, 109 Kan. 518, 200 P. 270 (1921); Pattridge
v. Palmer, 201 Minn. 387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937). Professor Vernon categorizes
this as the "realist" approach and generally favors it saying, "While perhaps theoretically unsound, the more extreme view, accepting the multipleplace-of-arising, forwards the basic objectives more so than does the singleplace-of-arising position [based on where the breach occurred.]" Vernon,
Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32
RocKY Mr. L. REV. 287, 303 (1960).
81. E.g., Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shops, Inc., 235 F. Supp.
640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Texas 1967)
(indemnity against plaintiff's accountant arose when Internal Revenue
Service assessed deficiency against plaintiff).
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suffers that loss. Some courts hold that it occurs when a judgment
is entered against him; S 2 others say it does not occur until the

judgment is paid or the claim is settled;8 3 and still others do not
make a decision as between the time of judgment and the time
of paying it.84
In the majority of cases, including the principal case, there is
no need to distinguish between judgment and payment of judgment
to determine the actual time that a cause of action for indemnity
arises. Usually those events will be close together. But if such a
distinction is necessary, the better view is that the action for
indemnity arises upon the payment rather than upon judgment. In
a situation where there is a judgment, yet no payment, having the
cause of action accrue at judgment would be inequitable. To
hold that a cause of action arises for indemnity when there is no
loss (payment) would be to allow a party to recover, although
nominally, when he has given up nothing.
The most difficult question and the central controversy in
Mack is where the cause of action for indemnity arose. The majority held that when an action for indemnity arises and where it
arises are "in pari nateria.'8 5 That is, the cause of action arises
when the payment is made in satisfaction of the claim and where
that payment is made. The judgment was paid on June 30, 1960, in
Florida; therefore, the cause of action for indemnity arose on that
date in Florida. What little authority can be found generally
supports the Mack decision.8 6 There is some authority, however,
that the cause of action arises at the place where the agreement
87
which gave rise to the later action for indemnity was entered.
The court in George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., s8 addressed itself
to this problem as to where the cause of action arose. A defective
airplane was manufactured and delivered in California where the
defendant manufacturer's major place of business was located.
82. Moffat v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165 (M.D.
Pa. 1964); Carbondale v. Cohen, 35 Lackawanna 68 (C.P. Pa. 1933); O'Boyle
v. Scranton, 21 Lackawanna 294 (C.P. Pa. 1920); Linkenhoger v. Amer.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953).
83. Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1962);
Steele v. Weidemann Machine Co., 153 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Orchel
App. 353 (1925); Runkle v. Pullin, 49 Ind. App. 619,
v. Rothschild, 238 Ill.
97 N.E. 956 (1912); Cohn v. Krauss, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 148, 67 N.E.2d 62 (1943).
84. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 161 F. Supp. (D.
Md. 1958); Ashley Borough v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 232 Pa.
425, 81 A. 442 (1911); Fisher v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 226, 170 A.
875 (1934); Rudman v. Scranton, 114 Pa. Super. 148, 173 A. 892 (1934).
85. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co.,
372 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir. 1966).
86. Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950 (lst Cir. 1952);
App. 353 (1925); Runkle v. Pullin, 49 Ind. App.
Orchel v. Rothschild, 238 Ill.
619, 97 N.E. 956 (1912).
87. Cohn v. Krauss, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 148, 67 N.E.2d 62 (1943).
88. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964).
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The plane crashed in Florida. Suit was brought by the airplane
crew in a federal court located in New York. The defendant had a
good defense under California's statute of limitations, but none under Florida's or New York's. Thus, the disposition of the case
rested upon where the cause of action arose. The court said:
"... a court required to choose between two linguistically permissible decisions as to where the cause of action 'arose' ought to
lean to the reading more likely to achieve the underlying policy
against prolonging the period of limitations ....,"89 It decided that
the cause of action arose in California, thereby allowing defendant
to plead his good defense. On the basis of this reasoning the Mack
court reached the proper decision in holding that the cause of action for indemnity arose in Florida rather than Pennsylvania.
Therefore, the Mack decision would seem to be correct in two respects: the cause of action arose in Florida, and significant contacts had no effect on the facts involved in this particular case.
Up to this point, discussion of the interaction between borrowing statutes and significant contacts has been limited to a two-state
possibility. Many conflict of laws problems, however, involve the
law of three or more jurisdictions 0 Consider the situation where
the cause of action arises in state A which has a tolling provision
stopping the running of its statute of limitations when the defendant cannot be served with process within its boundaries; the
defendant is a resident of state B which has unquestionably the
most significant contacts with the case; and the statute of limitations
of the forum, Pennsylvania, has not entirely run. Since Pennsylvania has accepted the significant contacts doctrine, it will look
to the substantive law of state B as the appropriate law to be applied. When the defendant pleads his defense under state B's
statute of limitations, it is submitted that his defense should be
sustained for these reasons: (1) state B has a major interest in the
outcome of the action and by their legislative determination a reasonable time has been allowed for suit on the cause of action;
(2) it would be an "unthinkable" result to use state B's substantive
law to decide the case yet disregard B's statute of limitations simply
because of a literal interpretation of the borrowing statute which
was enacted prior to the development of the significant contacts
doctrine; (3) the purposes of the borrowing statute, previously discussed,91 would be totally disregarded; (4) the plaintiff would be
under no hardship to watch the statute of limitations of state B
89. Id. at 78; accord, Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
90. George v. Douglas Aircraft Corp., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964) is an
example of a multi-state factual situation. An airplane was manufactured
and delivered in California by the defendant-corporation doing business
chiefly in that state. The litigation in a New York Federal Court revolved
around the crash of that plane in Florida. The plaintiffs in the action were
crew members who were residents of Texas.
91. See discussion p. 603-08 & notes 32-54 supra.
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since he would have to be aware of its substantive law to litigate
the case; and (5) the defendant was available for suit for a reasonable length of time in state B.
The obstacle confronting a court in attempting to reach the decision that the defendant should be able to plead a defense under
state B's statute of limitations is the language of Pennsylvania's
borrowing statute. The statute is aimed at recognizing the statute
of limitations defense only of the state "where the cause of action
arose." The language is clear and concise. In some cases the facts
would be sufficiently conflicting to allow the court to interpret the
cause of action as arising in state B. The George 92 court faced the
situation of having "two linguistically permissible decisions;" it
decided to lean "to a reading more likely to achieve the underlying
policy against prolonging the period of limitations." Unfortunately, not all cases will present "two linguistically permissible decisions" as to where the cause of action arose. If the cause of action
unequivocally arose in state A but the statute of limitations defense is available only in state B which has the most significant
contacts, a court holding that the cause of action arose in state B
would be guilty of legislating. It is submitted that such a defect
exists in Pennsylvania's borrowing statute and can only be remedied by a legislative enactment.
In limited situations, the result suggested above-that the defendant should have a defense under state B's statute of limitations-could be reached in other ways. For example, if state B's
statute of limitations was considered substantive rather than procedural, Pennsylvania, the forum, in deciding the case under B's
substantive law could take cognizance of B's statute of limitations
along with the rest of B's law. This method would necessitate
resurrecting the procedural-substantive distinction, a heretofore
unpopular theory 9 It should be used only as a last resort to
reaching the desired result.
Earlier, the question of whether Pennsylvania's borrowing statute would allow a defendant to plead a defense under a third, nonsignificant-contact state's statute of limitations was answered negatively. Then it was proposed that a defense under a third, significant-contact state's statute of limitations should be allowed under the present Pennsylvania borrowing statute if the facts were
such as to allow the judiciary to exercise discretion without usurping the legislative function. The next question is whether Pennsylvania's borrowing statute should be modified to allow a defendant to plead a defense gained under any state's statute of limita92. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964).
93. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of
Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the
Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960);
Development in the Law--Statutes of Limitation, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 1177,
1186-88 (1950).
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tions if that state is neither the forum, the state where the cause of
action arose, nor the state which has the most significant contacts? Pennsylvania's borrowing statute should not be modified to
that extent.9 4 The chief value of borrowing statutes is preventing
perpetual liability. Due to Pennsylvania's limited tolling statute,
perpetual liability will not occur in the conflict of laws situation;
therefore, the threat of perpetual liability is not a reason for extending the Pennsylvania borrowing statute. Although forum
shopping is a possibility, it has not proved to be a reality. Pennsylvania's courts are not swamped by tardy foreign plaintiffs attempting to litigate their cases. Additionally, if such a modification
were enacted, there would be placed on plaintiffs the heavy burden of seeing that the defendant does not establish a defense simply
by residing in a state, which has no connection with the facts of the
case, for the required amount of time to gain a statute of limitations defense. Pennsylvania's statute of limitations, limited tolling
provision, and present borrowing statute is adequate to induce
prompt litigation. Pennsylvania's borrowing statute, therefore,
should not be extended to allow a defendant to plead a defense
under the statute of limitations of a state which is not one of the
three previously mentioned-the state of the most significant contacts, the state where the cause of action arose, or the forum.
While Pennsylvania's present borrowing statute can in many
cases be properly interpreted to produce this result, situations will
arise where the court cannot arrive at the desired result due to the
clear language of the present borrowing statute. For example,
where the cause of action unquestionably arises in state A and
defendant's statute of limitations defense is in state B, the state
which has the most significant contacts, the court would be forced
to reject the defense. The solution to this problem is a legislative
enactment modifying the present borrowing statute to allow a
defendant to plead a statute of limitations defense gained under
the state where the cause of action arose or under the state which
has the most significant contacts. The following modification of
Pennsylvania's borrowing statute would achieve the desired result:
When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws
of the state or country which has the most significant contacts or in which the cause of action arose, such bar
shall be a complete defense to any action thereon brought
in any of the courts of this commonwealth.
CONCLUSION

During the period when Pennsylvania's conflict of laws system
94. This is contrary to the suggestion of authorities who have viewed

the problem. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict
of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the
Conflict of Laws: BorrowingStatutes, 32 RocxY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960).
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was based on the traditional rule, the borrowing statute and its
limited tolling statute served to avoid many conflict of laws problems which troubled other states. Pennsylvania's acceptance of
significant contacts created a difficulty because the borrowing statute as previously construed could not match the flexibility of significant contacts. To achieve this flexibility the borrowing statute
should be changed. The extension of the borrowing statute should
be limited to allowing the defendant to plead a defense under the
statute of limitations of the forum, the state where the cause of
action arose, or the state of the most significant contacts.
In a limited number of cases Pennsylvania's borrowing statute
can be interpreted to extend this far. Legislative action, however,
is necessary to prevent inequitable results in those cases where
the courts cannot in good faith allow the defendant to plead a defense under the significant-contact state's statute of limitations.
The Pennsylvania legislature should act to modify the present
borrowing statute. This would result in a conflict of laws system
in Pennsylvania which would be both flexible and symmetrical because the substantive law and limited procedural aspect (statute of
limitations) would be drawn from the same jurisdiction. Thus, the
balance of equities between the plaintiff and defendant which
worked well under the traditional rule system would be continued
under the significant contacts doctrine.
DONALD R. RIGONE

